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I. Introduction
In the late 1950s, American pop artist Jasper Johns' 1956 Green
Target painting sold for a mere four thousand dollars.1 The same year,
Marlon Brando gave a famous performance in On the Waterfront.2 Both
Johns' painting and Brando's performance are recognized as marshalling
* University of California, Hastings College of the Law, Juris Doctor Candidate 2008;
Georgetown University, B.A. in Government 2003.
1. Jane Rankin-Reid, The Politesse of Current Arts Funding Muffles Artists' Voices, On
Line Opinion, Oct., 28, 2002, http://www.onlineopinion.com.au /view.asp?article=468.
2. Id.
significant new movements into the American contemporary cultural
experience.3 Today, however, while Brando's breakthrough performance
continues to pay the actor's estate royalties, when Green Target resold for
several million dollars in the early 1990s, less than forty years after the
4original sale, Johns received not a single penny.
Droit de suite5 refers to a resale royalty which allows visual artists the
right to share in the increase in value of their work in sales subsequent to
the original sale.6 In jurisdictions without droit de suite legislation, such as
the United States, 7 the artist profits only from the original sale while the
dealers responsible for subsequent sales in the secondary market receive all
profits.8 Thus, visual artists are uniquely situated as compared to other
artists, such as authors, composers, and actors, who continuously
participate in the increase in value of their work in a way that visual artists
cannot. 9 They are not afforded the same protection under United States
federal intellectual property law. As United Kingdom art lawyer, Henry
Lydiate, points out:
In other creative fields artists are able to benefit from continuing
commercial use of their work e.g., the sale of published sheet music,
public performance . . . of their music, and sale of sound recordings
which incorporate their music .... Visual artists, by contrast, are rewarded
for only one kind of commercial use: sale of reproductions of their work..
. . They have no right to receive a royalty when their work is
commercially used by resale.'
0
3. Id.
4. Id. As will be mentioned later, admittedly, visual artists do get royalties from
reproductions such as postcards. However, visual artists are unique when compared to other
artists as their work may appreciate in value greatly over time and this increase in value is seen
mainly in the secondary art market-the sale and purchase of art post original sale. Visual artists
are not actors in this market and consequently do not participate in the increase in value of their
work in the same way as other artists do.
5. Driot de suite literally translates as "follow-up right." Jennifer B. Pfeffer, The Costs and
Legal Impracticalities Facing Implementation of the European Union's Droit de Suite Directive
in the United Kingdom, 24 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 533, 533 (2004).
6. Caslon Analytics Profile Droit de Suite, Caslon.com,
http://www.caslon.com.au/droitprofile.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
7. With the exception of the California Resale Royalty Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (West
2007).
8. Henry Lydiate, Artists Resale Royalty Right: Resale Royalty, ART!AW,
http://www.artquest.org.uk/artlaw/resaleroyaltyright/28829.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2008).
9. Id.; John M. Kernochan, The Distribution Right in the United States ofAmerica: Review
and Reflections, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1407, 1433 (1989); Jimmy A. Frazier, On Moral Rights,
Artist-Centered Legislation, and the Role of the State in Art Worlds: Notes on Building a
Sociology of Copyright Law, 70 TUL. L. REV. 313, 335 (1995).
10. Lydiate, Resale Royalty, supra note 8.
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Accordingly, the introduction of a droit de suite scheme provides
visual artists with a return equivalent to that received by other artists.'"
As such, the art market in the United States is strongly weighted
toward dealers. The view of artwork as strictly a sale of property leads
visual artists to become under-protected when compared to other copyright
holders. 12 The persistence of this exploitation is assisted further by the
uneven bargaining position between the typically poor artist and the more
powerful dealer.' 3 Droit de suite attempts to remedy this disparity.
Introduced first in France in the 1920s, the royalty was a direct
response to the starving artist phenomenon now strongly associated with
the Impressionist Period. 14 Most European countries, eleven of the fifteen
member states of what is now the European Union (EU), soon followed suit
by incorporating droit de suite provisions into their own copyright laws. 15
Not until 2001, however, did the EU adopt a directive requiring all member
states to implement resale royalties for visual artists. 16 To date, droit de
suite has not found much support within such countries as the United States
(with the exception of California), Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, as
well as countries within Asia. 17
The following will argue that while many criticisms against droit de
suite legislation are based on economic grounds, these grounds are not
11. Paul Lewis, The Resale Royalty and Australian Visual Artists: Painting the Full Picture,
8 MEDIA & ARTS L. REV. 306, 310 (2003), available at
http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/cmc/malr/843%2Lewis%2Article%2OFormatted%20for%/2Ow
eb.pdf.
12. Alexander Weatherall, Harmonising the Droit de Suite; a Legal and Economic Analysis of the
EC Directive and an Overview of the Recent Literature, in Vol. 2003, GERMAN WORKING PAPERS IN
LAW AND ECONOMICS, Article 22 at 10-16 (bepress.com 2003), available at
http://bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2003/iss 1/art22.
13. Id. at 18.
14. Michael B. Reddy, The Droit de Suite: Why American Fine Artists Should Have the
Right to Resale Royalty, 15 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 509, 515 (1995) ("The plight of artists' heirs was
given special emphasis in a widely published drawing which showed an auctioneer pounding his
hammer down saying, '100,000 francs, gone!', while two children in rags sitting in the front row
shouted, 'Look, one of Papa's paintings!' The fundamental unfairness of the art market
middlemen reaping enormous profits while artists and their families received nothing was
summed up in one account as 'real gold for the speculator, fool's gold for the artist."').
15. Caslon Analytics Profile Droit de Suite, supra note 6. The countries who had droit de
suite laws in place were Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, German, Greece, Italy,
Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. Christiane Ramanbordes, Economic Impact of the
European Directive on the Artist 's Resale Right or Droit de Suite, in Vol. XXXIV, No. 2,
COPYRIGHT BULLETIN, Economic Importance of Author's Rights: Doctrne, 25, 26 (UNESCO
2000), available at
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001225/122513eo.pdf.
16. Caslon Analytics Profile Droit de Suite, supra note 6; Council Directive 2001/84,
Resale Right for the Benefit of the Author of an Original Work of Art, art. 1, 2001 O.J. (L 272)
32 [hereinafter "Directive"].
17. Caslon Analytics Profile Droit de Suite, supra note 6.
2008]
those on which the royalty is and should be based. These arguments miss
the mark by focusing on the inadequacy of the economic value of the
royalty rather than viewing droit de suite as a "moral rights" 18 based
measure, providing visual artists fair and equal protection under
intellectual property law. Once one accepts the latter view and understands
the royalty as a measure necessary to remedy the unjust treatment of visual
artists under copyright law, the inadequate state of droit de suite in the
United States becomes clear.
Furthermore, while various methods of implementation have been
attempted in various countries and states, these methods have had varying
degrees of success. 19 The recent EU Directive on droit de suite appears to
have been structured in a way that considered carefully these successes and
failures by allowing member states to implement a central collection and
distribution agency.2° Its passage not only places pressure on the United
States to pass similar federal legislation, but also, unlike the California
Resale Royalty Act, provides the United States a workable model on which
to build.
II. Economic-Based Arguments Against Droit de Suite
The general consensus among economic analysts is that the droit de
suite has an effect opposite of that intended.21 They argue that the law not
only fails to help visual artists in a true economic sense but actually hurts
them.22 These opponents base much of their contentions on the lack of
economic value the droit de suite will have on the individual artist and the
art market as a whole.
A principle argument against the droit de suite claims that the actual
benefits received by the artist from the royalty will be diminished to
negligible returns as sale prices paid the artist drop in response to
accommodate the "tax. 2 3 If galleries are forced to pay artists a portion of
18. Moral rights are rights the artist retains "even though the work of art has been sold.
Once we accept this continuation of 'moral rights,' we should easily accept the notion that an
artist may retain rights to future royalties in a work of art even when he has long since parted with
the work." Jay B. Johnson, Copyright: Droit de Suite: An Artist Is Entitled to Royalties Even After
He's Sold His Soul to the Devil, 45 OKLA. L. REv. 493, 503 (1992).
19. See CLARE MCANDREW & LORNA DALLAS-CONTE, IMPLEMENTING DROIT DE SUITE
(ARTISTS' RESALE RIGHT) IN ENGLAND 25-26 (2002), available at
http://www.artscouncil.org.uk/documents/publications/325.pdf.
20. Directive, supra note 16, at art. 6.
21. MCANDREW AND DALLAS-CONTE, supra note 19, at 19.
22. Id.
23. Shirine Tiwari, Artist's Resale Rights, http://www.axa-art.co.uk/law/law002Print.html
(last visited Nov. 13, 2007); Johnson, supra note 18, at 505-506; Jon Sanford, Economic Analysis
of Droit de Suite - The Artist's Resale Royalty, 42 Australian Econ. Papers 386 (2003), available
at http://eprint. uq.edu.au/archive/00000433/01/DP301JanO2.pdf.
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the resale value of the work, the gallery may demand a lower price when
purchasing the painting from the artist in the first place.24 Given the
unequal bargaining positions between the two parties, the dealer will likely
prevail in lowering the market price of a piece of art at the initial sale.25
Consequently, the art market's reaction to the droit de suite will actually
prevent visual artists, in the end, from profiting economically.
Similarly, opponents also argue that individual art markets will do its
best to avoid its payment by transferring sales to jurisdictions that do not
impose the royalty. 26 Rational sellers and buyers when faced with
heightened costs imposed by the droit de suite will naturally search for a
way to evade payment and maximize profit.27 Thus, if the United States
were to adopt federal droit de suite legislation, opponents argue that art
dealers would simply transfer the art work to non-royalty countries such as
Switzerland or Japan (assuming, of course, that it is cheaper to do so).28
Such forum shopping within the European Union was a concern to which
the EU Directive was a solution. For instance, in 1988, well prior to the
enactment of the Directive, the sale of three Joseph Beuys paintings took
place in a London auction house for 462,000 GBP. 29 Both parties to the
sale were German nationals and it is suggested that a decisive factor in the
decision not to conduct the sale in the home state was circumvention of the
German resale royalty.3° Opponents' concern with forum shopping here
rests on the deduction that individual art markets in these jurisdictions will
suffer as a result.
31
24. Lewis, supra note 11, at 312.
25. Reddy, supra note 14, at 520.
26. Weatherall, supra note 12; Is London Done For?, ECONOMIST, July 14, 1997, at 54.
27. Is London Done For?, supra note 26.
28. Id. There are strong arguments against this view. Some, such as Henry Lydiate and
Catherine Trautmann, argue that the cost of transferring the piece of art is frequently more
expensive than the royalty itself. Weatherall, supra note 12, at 24; Henry Lydiate, Artists Resale
Royalty Right: Droit de Suite (1996), ARTAW,
http://www.artquest.org.uk/artlaw/resaleroyaltyright/28851.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2008).
Trautmann states "that considering the tax regimes in place in 1999, costs will amount to 22,000
Euros to sell a work in Switzerland or 33,000 Euros to ship to the United States. Clearly from
this simplified standpoint the maximum royalty payment or 12,500 Euros [see EU Directive] will
not encourage migration of sales to third countries." Weatherall, supra note 12, at 24. Lydiate
also relays a reassuring occurrence in London: "It is interesting and relevant to note that in 1992,
Sotheby's increased their buyer's commission from 10% to 15% (considerably more than the 2%
to 4% resale royalty that would be payable) and appear to have suffered no economic damage as a
result. Lydiate, Droit de Suite (1996), supra. Moreover, both Sotheby's and Christie's take a
commission not only from the buyer but also from the seller, which in Christie's case amounted
to around £5m of their profit in 1995." Id.
29. Weatherall, supra note 12, at 24.
30. Id.
31. Id. As will be discussed below, this was a major concern of the United Kingdom who
vigorously opposed the enactment of the EC Directive. London's art market grew to its large size
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Many critics of droit de suite also argue that there are no longer
starving artists; such a phenomenon is a myth, and resale royalties for
visual artists are aimed at aiding a group that no longer needs the
government's paternalistic assistance.32 These critics believe that if the
intention of the law is to make economically better off a disadvantaged
group of artists, the law is then based on a fictional premise.33
Further, critics also argue that many individuals are attracted to high
risk careers in the arts for the possibility of an eventual large payoff or the
significant non-monetary rewards of creation.34  In other words, these
artists are willing to sacrifice monetary gain for other advantages and are
no different than other members of society who merely happen to choose a
risky profession. 35 For example, "artists work a substantially lower average
number of hours, have more rapid earnings growth than other workers,
[and] fewer of them leave their professions than do workers in other
occupations. 36 Thus, the argument goes, if the law does not protect others
who enter precarious careers, why should artists deserve protection?
Moreover, the administrative costs associated with resale royalties
remains a continuous concern as well. Opponents of droit de suite
highlight that such costs outweigh the actual benefit received by artists.
Administering the collection and distribution of the droit de suite requires
an extensive infrastructure to work properly and effectively.39 Once the
costs of running this infrastructure are factored in, artists receive very little
money in-pocket, a result, they argue, is counter to the intention of the
royalty.40 For example:
because, pre-Directive, it did not have droit de suite measures in place while other European
countries, particularly France, did. Let the Bad Times Roll, ECONOMIST, Jan. 24, 2002. As of the
1990s, approximately 30% of all art sales in the world took place in London (second to New York
as the world's largest). London also dominates the European art market. Dealers and artists alike
were concerned that valuable art would exit the European art market generally, but more
particularly the London art market, should the Directive pass. Is London Done For?, supra note
26; Pre-Directive, the British art market "employ[ed] 51,000 people and ha[d] an annual turnover
of more than 2.2 billion GBP ... [Therefore] the United Kingdom [was] inclined to be protective
of its art market." Pfeffer, supra note 5, at 535.
32. "Droit de suite began in France supposedly to compensate the 'starving artist.'" Elliot C.
Alderman, Resale Royalties in the United States for Fine Vitsual Artists: An Alien Concept, FindLaw.com,





37. Weatherall, supra note 12, at 19; Johnson, supra note 18, at 510.
38. Alderman, supra note 32.
39. Weatherall, supra note 12, at 19.
40. Id.
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Danish society in charge of [Denmark's droit de suite royalty collection and
distribution] takes as much as 40% of the royalty to cover administrative
costs. The ADAGP, the French collecting agency, levies 20% before paying
artists. In some cases, especially in France during the last years, very little,
if anything, is left for the artists.
Moreover, because of the many expenses involved, the "motivation to
deviate from the regime will always be higher than the incentives to
maintain it. ' '42 Thus, not only will artists receive a significantly diminished
royalty due to administrative expenses, but it is unlikely they will receive
anything at all if neither party involved (i.e., the artist, the dealer, and the
government) is motivated to preserve the collection and distribution
scheme.43
Overall, these arguments conclude that the droit de suite will fail to
accomplish its goal of providing incentive to artists to create because it
fails to improve economically the position of both the artists and the art
market.
Il. Accepting Droit de Suite as a Moral Right
as Opposed to an Economic One"
There are many papers and articles that address specifically and
individually the above arguments. 45 The point of this note is not to imitate
those counter-arguments but rather alter the way in which one views and
justifies the implementation of droit de suite. The royalty is most
frequently attacked on its lack of economic pragmatism and attractiveness.
However, if one begins with the United States Constitution and examines
the overarching goals of intellectual property law in general, as pertains to
the arts, resale royalties for visual artists are justified not because they
benefit economically the artist and the art market, but because by making
more fair the treatment of visual artists they provide an incentive for
creativity, even if that incentive is not purely economic in nature.
41. Victor Ginsburgh, The Economic Consequences of Droit de Suite in the European
Union 5 (2006), available at http://www.ecare.ulb.ac.be/ecare/people
/members/ginsburgh/papers/144.consequences.pdf.
42. Weatherall, supra note 12, at 19.
43. Id.
44. Opponents and "[most] proponents of the droit de suite argue that it is an economic
right, because it protects an economic interest .... The purpose of the droit de suite is to give
visual artists rights and economic incentives similar to those the law gives authors and musicians.
... What makes the droit de suit not an economic right, but a moral one, is its inalienability ....
The reason for the right's inalienability is to address what the right's creator considered the
artist's lack of bargaining power." Pfeffer, supra note 5, at 547-48.
45. See Frazier, supra note 9. See Kernochan, supra note 9; Reddy, supra note 14.
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Congressional power to regulate intellectual property rests on the
more general power to promote progress in the areas of art and science.4 6
The goal of intellectual property law is to encourage people to engage in
activities from which society as whole will benefit. 4 Thus, through
copyright, trademark, patent, and trade secret law Congress uses its power
to provide incentive and ensure continued innovativeness.
48
Just as with other intellectual property protections, one notion behind
droit de suite is also based on providing an incentive for creativity.49 The
point of the resale royalty is to generate a fair environment in which artists
feel as though their efforts are protected and rewarded, an incentive in and
of itself.50 As Lydiate argues, for the art market to function properly, we
need to be able to promise a fair return on output.5' In order to encourage
production of art, visual artists must feel as though they are being treated
fairly under intellectual property law by being able to participate in the
increased value of their work.
5 2
Opponents, and some proponents, assume that an incentive for
creativity must be an economic incentive. As has been demonstrated
above, those against the royalty argue that droit de suite fails to provide this
economic encouragement. Those in favor of the royalty argue that it
does. 53 In other words, they argue that droit de suite is an effective
mechanism that will make better off the economic situation of visual
artists. 4 However, that is not the appropriate aim of droit de suite. The
royalty attempts to encourage creativity by sending the message to visual
artists that their contribution is as of equal value to that of other artists that
46. Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution states that Congress shall have the
power to promote the progress of science and the useful arts. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
47. Id.
48. ROBERT MERGES, PETER MENDELL, & MARK LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 11-17 (Aspen Publishers, 4th ed. 2006).
49. Id.; "The introduction ofa droit de suite internalizes a portion of this value to the artists and gives
them an incentive to increase and maintain the quality ofthe body of work over a lifetime. The law thus
allows the artist to share in the appreciation in value and creates an incentive to hasten the time of
'discovery,' presumably by increasing the current quality ofwork compared to that without a droit de
suite." Carson W. Bays, Does a Droit de Suite Benefit Artists? The Case of California, 2 (2006), available
athtp://www.fokus.or.at/fileadmin/fokus/user/downloads/acei-paper/Bays.doc.
50. Henry Lydiate, Artists Resale Royalty Right: Follow up Follow up Follow up, 'till the
Fields Ring Again and Again, ART!AW, http://www.artquest.org.uk
/artlaw/resaleroyaltyright/28831 .htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2007).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. "A resale royalty would provide artists with an economic incentive to create more works
of art." Johnson, supra note 18, at 500; Kernochan, supra note 9, at 1435.
54. Kemochan, supra note 9, at 1435.
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receive protection. "The rationale behind the droit de suite is that artists
should participate in the increasing value of their art."
55
Thus, the major criticisms against the royalty fall short. While
economic-based concerns with the droit de suite are perhaps important
when discussing the utility of its implementation, as is discussed infra, they
do not relate to the underlying intent of the measure: recognition of an
artist's right to participate in the increased value of his work. A right to
participate equally and fairly cannot be disputed on economic grounds and
unfortunately, these arguments cloud the debate as to whether droit de suite
is an appropriate measure in the first place.
IV. Droit De Suite in the United States
at the Federal Level
In 1989 the United States signed onto the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.56 Article 14 of this international
copyright treaty provides: "The author, or after his death the persons or
institutions authorized by national legislation, shall with respect to original
works of art enjoy the inalienable right to an interest in any sale of the work
subsequent to the first transfer by the author of the work." 57  The
Convention therefore allows implementation of droit de suite by countries
party to the treaty.58 The contracting countries, however, "agreed that the
droit de suite would not be a minimum convention requirement." 59 Thus,
as it is not binding, most countries without droit de suite laws already in
place, including the United States, refrained from implementing this Article
when signing onto Berne.
60
55. McANDREW & DALLAS-CONTE, supra note 19, at 19.
56. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, available at
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/ip/beme/pdf/trtdocswo00l.pdf [herein-after Berne
Convention]. This treaty is the only international treaty dealing solely with copyright protection.
See World Intellectual Property Organization, Treaties and Contracting Parties: General
Information, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ general/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2007). The aim of
this Convention was to help nationals of its member States obtain international protection of their
right to control, and receive payment for, the use of their creative works. Id. As of February 24,
2007, 163 countries had become party to the Convention. See World Intellectual Property
Organization, Contracting Parties to the Berne Convention,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty-id=15 (last visit-ed Feb. 24,
2007).
57. Berne Convention, supra note 56, at art. 14.
58. Frazier, supra note 9, at 338.
59. Pfeffer, supra note 5, at 539.
60. Europa.eu, Summary of Directive 2001/84, Resale Right for the Benefit of the Author of
an Original Work of Art, http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb
/126049.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2007).
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The proximate impetus for urging the importation of the European
concept of droit de suite into the United States did not really come until the
celebrated conflict between investor Robert Scull and artist Robert
Rauschenberg.6' Scull had originally purchased a painting, Thaw, directly
from Rauschenberg in the 1950s for 800 USD.62 Twenty years later he
resold it at auction for 85,000 USD.63 This left Rauschenberg distraught
over his inability to participate in the increased value of his work, a right
provided others, such as authors and composers, however not visual
artists. Consequently, this conflict highlighted nationally the
disadvantaged position of visual artists in the art market.65
Soon thereafter, an attempt to implement federal droit de suite
legislation was made by Senator Edward Kennedy and Representative
Edward Markey; however, their proposal never passed as part of the Visual
Artists Rights Act of 1990 (hereinafter "VARA"). 66 The Kennedy-Markey
proposal provided for an inalienable right to seven-percent resale royalties
for the lifetime of the artist and up to fifty years after his death.67 The
seven-percent royalty would apply only to works resold for more than
1,000 USD and only to the amount in excess of the original sale price.68
This proposal received criticism not uncommon against droit de suite
legislation: "They help the few who need help the least; they decrease the
incentive for investment in works of art; they assume that artists are
incompetent to alienate property; and they create a costly bureaucracy to
engage a national registration system for art.,,6 9 Given the many criticisms
that clouded the debate and distracted from the true aim of droit de suite
legislation, VARA passed without inclusion of royalty rights for visual
artists.7° Instead, VARA merely requires the "Register of Copyrights, in
consultation with the Chair of the National Endowment for the Arts, to
61. Ben W. Bloch, William W. Damon, & C. Elton Hinshaw, Visual Artists' Rights Act of
1987: A Case of Misguided Legislation, 8 CATO J. 71, 72 (1988).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.; "' I have been working my ass offjust for you to make that profit!'. . . Painter Robert
Rauschenberg to art collector Robert Scull after the resale of his painting 'Thaw' for $85,000, the
painting was purchased ten years earlier by Scull for $900." ROBERT E. DUFFY, ART LAW:
REPRESENTING ARTISTS, DEALERS AND COLLECTORS 264, 264 n.4 (1977) (citing Roger
Ricklefs, Artists Decide They Should Share Profits on Resale of Paintings, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11,
1974, at 1; Robert Hughes, A Modest Proposal: Royalties for Artists, TIME, Mar. 11, 1974, at
66)." Reddy, supra note 14, at 509.
65. Reddy, supra note 14, at 509.
66. Johnson, supra note 18, at 499.
67. Bloch, Damon & Hinshaw, supra note 61, at 72.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 77-78.
70. Johnson, supra note 18, at 500; Frazier, supra note 9, at 342-343.
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study the feasibility of implementing a resale royalty on the sale of works
of visual art.",71 Thus, despite the urging of many artists, legislators and
scholars, the United States has yet to pass and put into operation resale
royalties for visual artists.
72
V. Droit de Suite in the United States at the State Level -
California: A Misguided Step in the Right Direction
To date, the United States' only experience with implementation of
any droit de suite measures is the California Resale Royalty Act of 1977
(hereinafter "the California Act").73 The California Act has been praised as
"plac[ing] California at the forefront of a growing international movement
to improve the legal position of artists. '74 It expresses "a principle of parity
between the visual artist and other creators, and it gives recognition - in the
visual arts - to the underlying policy of the Constitution that all creators
should have the right to participate in the commercial use of their work.,
75
The California Act took effect on January 1, 1977, and protects the
inalienable right of the artist and his estate to receive royalty payments
until twenty years after his death.76 It applies to all public and private sales
by California residents of original paintings, sculptures, drawings, and
glass arts.7 7 The royalty is set at five percent and the resale price necessary
for the resale royalty to kick in is 1,000 USD.78
Under the California Act, there is no central collection agency and no
right to information from sellers, dealers, and auction houses.79 It is the
obligation of the seller both to locate the artist and pay the royalty due, a
payment which generally comes out of the seller's own pocket.8° If the
seller is unable to locate and pay the artist, he then provides the California
Arts Council 8' with the artist's name and the funds due.8 2 The Council
must then attempt to locate the artist and administer the royalty for a
71. Alderman, supra note 32.
72. Frazier, supra note 9, at 338.
73. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (West 2007).
74. Lydiate, Resale Royalty, supra note 8.
75. Id.
76. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(d); William Carleton, Copyright Royalties for Visual Artists: A
Display-Bases Alternative to the Droit de Suite, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 510, 531 (1991); CAL. CIV.
CODE § 986(a)(7).
77. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(c)(1).
78. Id. § 986(a)(1); id. § 986(b)(2).
79. MCANDREW & DALLAS-CONTE, supra note 19, at 43-44. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 986.
80. McANDREW & DALLAS-CONTE, supra note 19, at 43. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 986.
81. California Arts Council, http://cac.ca.gov (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
82. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(a)(2) (West 2007).
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statutory period of seven years. 83 In the frequent event that the Council is
unable to find the artist the artist's right terminates and the money reverts
to the Council for use in purchasing fine art for its Art in Public Buildings
Program. 84 In the also common event that a seller fails to pay the artist the
royalty and fails to provide the Council with the artist's name and the
money due, "the artist can bring damages within three years after the date
of the sale or one year after the discovery of the sale, whichever is
longer.,85
The California system differs from the EU Directive and other
European droit de suite systems in several respects. First, generally in
Europe, royalty rights last approximately seventy years beyond the death of
the artist, a duration identical to that of U.S. copyright law.86 Moreover,
the royalty usually applies only to public sales, not those that occur in
private settings.87 These minor differences, however, are not those that
truly distinguish the California Act from others. Most droit de suite
legislation in European countries, prior to the EU Directive, provided for a
central collection agency and allowed at least partial rights to
information. 88 As mentioned above, California provides nothing of the sort
and arguably this lack of an adequate enforcement mechanism is the
system's largest fault.
89
There appears to be a general consensus that the Act is at best
ineffective and at worst disastrous. 90 Critics of the law generally fall into
two camps. 91 There are those that point to the legislation as an example of
the inevitable failure of all droit de suite measures and those who champion
the implementation of droit de suite, but find inherent faults in the
California system.92 The United Kingdom falls in the former camp.
83. Id. § 986(a)(5); California Resale Royalty Act, California Arts Council,
http://www.cac.ca.gov/95/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
84. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(a)(5); McANDREW & DALLAS-CONTE, supra note 19, at 43.
85. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(a)(3); McANDREW & DALLAS-CONTE, supra note 19, at 44.
86. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(d); MCANDREW & DALLAS-CONTE, supra note 19, at 10, 14.
87. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(c)(1). This is true of the EU Directive and individual legislation in
countries: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, and Germany prior to the directive. MCANDREW &
DALLAS-CONTE, supra note 19, at 10.
88. The directive allows Member States to chose their own method of collection and
distribution. Directive, supra note 16, at art. 6. Prior to the directive, Denmark, Finland, France,
and Germany all used central collection agencies. MCANDREW & DALLAS-CONTE, supra note
19, at 10. See also Ramanbordes, supra note 15, at 26 (chart which demonstrates that almost all
pre-existing droit de suite collection systems had mandatory central collection mechanisms).
89. MCANDREW & DALLAS-CONTE, supra note 19, at 44.
90. Reddy, supra note 14, at 530.
91. Id.
92. Frazier, supra note 9, at 339.
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Following final passage of the EU Directive, the United Kingdom was
forced to bring to an end their vigorous battle against droit de suite
legislation.93 Having come to grips with the inevitable, the Arts Council of
England (hereinafter "the Arts Council") performed an extensive study of
various droit de suite systems in order to determine the best methods to
implement the measure in the United Kingdom. 94 Their conclusions, as
discussed infra, essentially recommended that the United Kingdom ignore
most characteristics of the California system. 95 Specifically, the Arts
Council of England criticizes California's collection and distribution
mechanism, or lack thereof.96 Their report states that even the California
Arts Council, the only body entrusted with any implementation power,
finds the collection and distribution procedure to be problematic:
97
It is often difficult to locate the artist and there is no system whereby
artists register with the [California] Council or any connections to unions
or other organizations for visual artists. The Council has no means of
monitoring who is paying the royalty or not and has no designated
funding to run the system but must take it from existing staff and budgets.
The Arts Council's responsibility is merely to hold on to money for
artists; it is not an enforcement agency that tracks the amounts of art sold
or by whom. The Council does not retain any administration costs for
locating artists or track the amount of time or money spent locating artists
and administering the levy.9
8
They also report that between the years 1993 and 2000 the California Arts
Council averages a mere annual payment of 802 USD to artists.
99
Unfortunately, the California Act is placing its force in the hands of
those who it negatively affects, the seller: 100
In a 1986 survey of artists conducted by Bay Area Lawyers for the Arts
("BALA"), thirty-two percent of the respondents said dealers had refused to give
them the name or address of the buyer or even the resale price, despite their right
under the law to assign collection of the royalty to another. In a comment
submitted to the Copyright Office as part of its study of the droit de suite,
California arts attorney Peter Karlen stated that artists are unable to collect their
royalty because art dealers 'feel they can get away with it.' He also noted that
many galleries will not deal with an artist who demands a written agreement. Even
if the artist gets the gallery to agree to a contract, he must still rely on the dealer to
93. Is London Done For?, supra note 27.
94. MCANDREW & DALLAS-CONTE, supra note 19, at 7.
95. Id. at 64-65.
96. Id. at 43-44.
97. Id.




provide all of the information regarding the resalle and to collect the royalty.
Many dealers fail to do so for months or even years.
Moreover, the law provides no right to information mechanism to monitor
payment of artists' royalties.'0 2 Thus, the only check on the seller is the
artist, who, in most situations, must seek payment himself. 103 This is
insufficient for numerous reasons. First, this requires that the artist be
aware of all resales-an unrealistic burden not placed on artists in other
countries. Second, if the artist becomes aware that he has not been paid
royalties due and request of payment made to the seller does not produce
results, his only recourse becomes the pursuance of damages, an avenue
artists are not often willing or financially able to take. 10 4 What results is a
resale system enforced by no one. While there have been a few cases
where artists have taken sellers to court for non-payment, the general
attitude of both artists and sellers seems to be evasion rather than
compliance.I05 The California Arts Council reports that not only has their
inability to monitor art sales made it extremely difficult to enforce the
royalty, but they are further hindered by the fact that the California Act
itself also lacks any "teeth."'1 06 Thus, neither party involved, not the state,
the seller, nor the artist, is willing to enforce compliance with the
California droit de suite legislation.
This lack of motivation to enforce the Act is merely compounded by
the fact that California is the only state within the U.S. with measures in
place to provide visual artists royalties, a situation likely to lead to forum
shopping. 0 7 As many critics argue, "art produced by California artists and
resold within the state is subject to a substantial price penalty compared to
comparable works sold in states where the royalty does not apply."'0 8 This
consequently negatively affects the California art market. By shifting art
sales to venues outside of the state, affected artists receive no royalty
income at all. 09 This movement is so strong and the number of resales
within the state is so small that "it is very unlikely that the cumulative
effect of the royalty over time offsets even a modest initial price
penalty."11
0
101. Reddy, supra note 14, at 523-24.
102. McANDREW & DALLAS-CONTE, supra note 19, at 43.
103. Id. at 44.
104. Id. at 43-44; Pfeffer, supra note 5, at 559.
105. McANDREW & DALLAS-CONTE, supra note 19, at 47.
106. Id.
107. Sanford, supra note 23, at 8; Kemochan, supra note 9, at 1433-34.
108. Bays, supra note 49, at 7.
109. Id. at 8.
110. Id.
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It is clear the California Resale Royalty Act has been ignored and
brushed under the carpet by all those in the California legal and art market.
This failure, however, should not be seen as an indication of the failure of
droit de suite in general, but should be viewed as an unsuccessful
experiment in its implementation. Droit de suite has not failed in other
countries and, as will be argued below, the EU Directive, incorporating
many of the successful characteristics of the systems in these countries,
may serve as model legislation for the United States at the federal level.
VI. The EU Directive on Droit de Suite:
A Move Away From the Failures of the California System
Proposed initially in 1996, Directive 2001/84/EC, requiring member
countries to implement droit de suite measures, did not go into force until
October 13, 2001, and was not implemented until January 1, 2006.1' Its
major goals are "to remove distortions in the internal market to remedy the
unequal treatment of artists between different member states."' 112  The
Council of Europe took the initial common position that "a precondition for
the proper functioning of the internal market was that distortions of
competition and displacement of sales caused by differences in national
provisions on the resale right should be eliminated."' 1 3 The underlying
intent was to create a level playing field amongst all artists in order to
discontinue the race to the bottom occurring within the European Union.'l4
At the time of the Directive's enactment, four of the European
Union's fifteen member states had no droit de suite measures in place.
1 15
The Directive, aimed at harmonization, removes from the United Kingdom,
Ireland, Austria, and Holland the freedom of choice offered under Article
14 of the Berne Convention.' 16 It now makes mandatory legislation which
has never been required among states. Countries, particularly the United
Kingdom, which had failed to impose droit de suite measures on their own
111. MCANDREW & DALLAS-CONTE, supra note 19, at 15-16. Adoption followed much
debate in which a few states, particularly the UK, actively opposed the proposal. The UK was
particularly concerned that its art market would suffer and that art sales would be directed not
only outside of London, but outside the EU. Finally, in 2001, however, the EU reached a
unanimous compromise. Pfeffer, supra note 5, at 533.
112. Weatherall, supra note 12, at 8.
113. MCANDREW & DALLAS-CONTE, supra note 19, at 15.
114. Weatherall supra note 12, at 8; Pfeffer, supra note 5, at 540.
115. Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, German, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal,
Spain, and Sweden had droit de suite measures in place. Ramanbordes, supra note 15, at 26, 28.
The UK, Ireland, Austria, and the Netherlands did not have droit de suite measures in place at the
time of adoption of the Directive. Pfeffer, supra note 5, at 537.
116. Lewis, supra note 11, at 308.
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prior to the Directive, would no longer enjoy the advantages such failure
brought them within the European art market.'"
7
The Directive, similar to the California Act, specifically determines
the legal form and content of the resale right. In order for a right to the
royalty to apply, the work, sale, and art must all qualify. The "work" must
be an original work "of graphic or plastic art."" The "sale" applies to
public sales only; thus, it must involve an art market professional such as a
saleroom, gallery, auction house, or dealer.' 9 And, in order for the "art" to
qualify, the artist must be a national of a member state or of another
country which has droit de suite provisions in place.
20
The minimum sale price at which the royalty applies may not be
placed at more than 3,000 Euros.' 2 1 Set at this threshold the Directive
allows for payment on a sliding scale beginning with four percent on works
of art over 3,000 Euros to a quarter of one percent on works over 500,000
Euros. 122 The right of the visual artist to receive these royalties under the
Directive is inalienable and lasts seventy years beyond the artist's death, at
which point it is transferable to his heirs. 123 All member states had until
January 1, 2006 to implement such legislation, however, those states
without droit de suite measures in place prior to passage of the Directive
may limit payment of the royalty to living artists until 2010.124
As mentioned above, the Directive's main point of departure from the
California Act is its allowance for a central collection agency at the state's
discretion under Article 6. 125 This provision allows for member states
without droit de suite measures in place, or those few states with droit de
suite measures but without a central mechanism for collection and
distribution, to create a central institution for implementation under the
Directive. 126 This provision attempts to prevent the main weakness found
in the California system, but, as the following will discuss, perhaps does
not go as far as necessary.
117. Pfeffer, supra note 5, at 541.
118. Directive, supra note 16, at art. 2. Examples include pictures, collages, paintings,
drawings, engravings, prints, lithographs, sculptures, tapestries, ceramics, glassware and
photographs. Id.
119. Id. at art. 1(2).
120. Id. at art. 7.
121. Id. at art. 3.
122. Id. at art. 4.
123. Id. at art. 1(1), 6(1).
124. Id. at art. 8(2); Also, a state may request a two year extension as to applying royalties to
non-living artists. Pfeffer, supra note 5, at 543.
125. Directive, supra note 16, at art. 6(2); Member States may provide for the optional or
compulsory collective management by collecting societies. Id.
126. Id.
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VII. The EU Directive as a Model for U.S. Federal Legislation:
The Need for a
Central Implementation Agency
Even before the passage of the EU Directive, commentators urged the
adoption of a federal droit de suite statute in the United States., 27 And,
while it is certainly too early to commend or criticize the Directive's
successes or failures, its passage and implementation leads one to logically
question: Will the United States finally be next? Certainly their history
with droit de suite is questionable, yet, perhaps the Directive provides not
only the final push needed, but a workable model on which the United
States can build upon and use to create their own national legislation.
Amongst the various systems discussed thus far, there are many
common factors (i.e., the threshold price, the minimum and maximum
royalty rates, the applicability of the royalty to public and private sales, and
etc.). And while these factors are vital to the implementation of the
royalty, their inclusion does not seem to mark the success or failure of any
particular system. As study of the California system indicates, in order for
royalty legislation to be properly enforced the imperative element is
provision for a single central agency entrusted with collection and
distribution.1
28
The United Kingdom discovered this as well. Following the passage
of the EU Directive, they were forced to bring to an end their vigorous
battle against droit de suite legislation.129 Having come to grips with the
inevitable, it began to research the most effective and efficient methods of
enforcing droit de suite. 130 In 2000, the Arts Council began to examine
current practices of collecting and distributing droit de suite in other
countries. 131 They studied the systems in Belgium, Denmark, Germany,
Finland, France, and California. 132 The Arts Council noted that Germany,
Finland, France, and Denmark all use a "central agency to manage the
royalty, whereas the other Member States have a number of societies
involved in the collection procedure."' 133 They purposely and accurately
point out that California is a slightly different system as it is the seller's
obligation to find the artist and pay the royalty. 134 In analyzing the results
127. See Johnson, supra note 18, at 513-17. See also Kernochan, supra note 9, at 1434.




132. Henry Lydiate, Artists Resale Royalty Right: Droit de Suite (2002), ART!AW,
http://www.artquest.org.uk/artlaw/resaleroyaltyright/28856.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2007).
133. See MCANDREW & DALLAS-CONTE, supra note 19, at 45.
134. Id.
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of these various practices, the Arts Council comes to the same conclusion
that many other European countries presumably have as well: a central
collection agency is the best method to implement droit de suite.'
35
The Arts Council Report finds there to be many advantages to a
centrally managed collection and distribution system. Most importantly, "it
is easier to establish and maintain cooperation with artists and the art trade
if one central agency has sole responsibility for collecting royalties."136
Thus, it also makes the job of matching the sale and the royalty to the artist
more straightforward and inevitably easier.1 37 Moreover, "[w]hen only one
society is looking after all resale rights this brings synergy and cost-
savings. Handling a large pool of artists and sales gives the society
experience of the procedures and art works involved, which allows them to
gain knowledge and skills more quickly."'
' 38
Further, a "central collecting society can gain sales information in a
manner that is least disruptive to the art trade ... Especially in the case of
private dealers where individual resales may be hard to track. 1 39 The Report
also notes that when there is more than one collection agency, or no agency
at all, efficiency decreases as does the ability to monitor and assess the
system: "It is easier to gather and evaluate statistics on collection and
distribution when there is only one central agency.'
' 40
Finally, the Arts Council highly stressed the necessity of creating a
mechanism that allows for a right to information by the collecting and
distributing body. 14 1 The artist and the central collection agency should be
entitled to information from the seller, possibly as part of a regulated timely
procedure. 142 This would ensure compliance. The Arts Council
recommends a system with "an ability to identify the auction houses and
dealers making sales for which the royalty falls due; an open and
transparent method of recording sales, including sales on the internet, the
price agreed and the royalty due, by dealers and auction houses; the right of
collection and/or distribution bodies to have information about sales ... a
record of the collection and distribution of royalty fees; ... [and] a control
system which ensures that all transactions and systems are transparent and
accountable."
143
135. Id. at 64-65.
136. Id. at 45.
137. Id. at 46.
138. Id. at 46.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 46.
141. Id. at 47-48.
142. Id. at 12, 47.
143. Id. at 12.
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For all intents and purposes, the Arts Council's Report forecloses on
the notion that for droit de suite to function properly a system similar to
that of California can be adopted. Rather, the Report concludes that an
open system with one central body for collection and distribution, as found
in Germany, Denmark, and Finland, is ideal.
144
Thus, while federal legislation mimicking the EU Directive is a start,
it is not the complete answer. Whether a national mechanism is created or
the federal government requires each individual state to centrally manage
their own royalty collection and distribution, it is clear from the inadequacy
of the California Act that these tasks may not be left to the seller's own
devise. Moreover, if individual states in a federal system are allowed to
choose their own collection and distribution systems (i.e., whether to
centrally collect and distribute or not), forum shopping may persist. 145 A
seller may opt for purchases and sales in the California art market, for
instance, whose system results in infrequent collection and distribution of
royalty payments, over a state whose system diligently collects and
distributes them.
Accordingly, what is needed is federal legislation that perhaps follows
the structure of the Directive, but in addition makes mandatory a central
body, at the state or federal level, that can monitor, collect, and distribute
royalty payments. Certainly this will lead to additional administration
costs; however, it is the only way to ensure the rights of visual artists to
royalty payments are not only recognized, but also realized.
VIII. Conclusion
Implementation of effective droit de suite measures is necessary to
provide visual artists equal and fair protection under intellectual property
law. Provisions allowing for the participation of these artists in the
increase in value of their work in the secondary market will alone provide
the incentive essential to promote the continuance of creativity in the arts, a
good from which the public as a whole will benefit.
This nation is part of an international community that is increasingly
recognizing and requiring droit de suite legislation. Following the
enactment of the EU Directive, the United States should be hard-pressed to
implement its own federal measures. While the Directive provides a model
superior California's, the United States, however, could be the first to
implement legislation at the federal level requiring a central collection
144. Id. at 10, 12.
145. Johnson, supra note 18, at 498-99. Johnson mentions the several problems that may
arise if states are allowed to choose their own collection methods; for example: conflicting state
collection mechanisms, collusion, and duplicative effort among states. Id.
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mechanism among or within states-a model others in the future could
follow when legislating their own droit de suite measures.
